SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER
Does Multi-Attribute Bidding in Public Construction Projects Prevent Corruption while Tenderers’ Preferences are Open? A Study of China’s Practice
Jianhong He 1
,  
Qing Yang 2  
,  
 
 
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1
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing, P. R. CHINA
2
School of Foreign Languages, Donghua University, Shanghai, P. R. CHINA
Online publish date: 2017-11-25
Publish date: 2017-11-25
 
EURASIA J. Math., Sci Tech. Ed 2017;13(12):8343–8358
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This article belongs to the special issue "Problems of Application Analysis in Knowledge Management and Science-Mathematics-Education".
ABSTRACT
This paper establishes a method of supply-chain multi-attribute reverse auction. Presuming the tenderers’ preference is open, the paper proposes a non-cooperative multi-attribute bidding game model about public construction projects and analyzes the bidding strategies of tenderers and bidders. Through the simulation of a case in China, we find that: (1) the more committed of the tenderers to construction quality and schedule, the greater benefits, enthusiasm in bidding, and tenderer’s surplus; (2) the bidder’s benefits have a U-shaped relationship respectively with the bidding quality and the construction period; and (3) the greater the bidder’s construction quality and period cost coefficients, the smaller the tenderer’s surplus. Such conclusions indicate, the improvement of the bidding rules or procedures can contribute to restricting the behavior of tenderer and bidder, furthermore reducing the corruption possibility of public construction projects.
 
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