SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER
Extend TOPSIS-Based Two-Sided Matching Decision in Incomplete Indifferent Order Relations Setting Considering Matching Aspirations
Bingwen Yu 1
,  
Qi Yue 2  
 
 
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1
School of Economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, CHINA
2
School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, CHINA
Online publish date: 2017-11-24
Publish date: 2017-11-24
 
EURASIA J. Math., Sci Tech. Ed 2017;13(12):8155–8168
KEYWORDS
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This article belongs to the special issue "Problems of Application Analysis in Knowledge Management and Science-Mathematics-Education".
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a method for two-sided matching decision in the environment of incomplete indifferent order relations. The two-sided matching decision problem with incomplete indifferent order relations and matching aspirations is firstly described. In order to solve this problem, the incomplete indifferent order relations are converted into the generalized Borda number matrices. The matching aspiration matrix can be determined based on the model calculation on the reciprocal differences of generalized Borda numbers. On this basis, the weighted satisfaction degree matrices are set up. The extended relative closeness matrices are determined by using an extended TOPSIS technique. Moreover, a two-sided matching model is developed. The two-sided matching alternative can be obtained by solving the model. For the purpose of illustration, an example including sensitivity analysis is presented.
 
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