Game Analysis of Benefit Relationship between State and Enterprises from the Perspective of National Participation in Profit of SOEs
Xiao-Ling Zheng 1 *
More Detail
1 Minjiang University, CHINA
* Corresponding Author

Abstract

Should SOEs pay a cost price for the unique advantages of the monopoly position they have and the tilting of financial policies? When it comes to national participation in profit, the benefit game relation between the state and enterprises will pose an impact on dividend benefit of nationals and sustainable development of enterprises. Since reform and opening up of China, the SOE dividend distribution has gone through several reforms. The current profit delivering ratio is lower than 30%. Depending on the nature, period and industry, the different choice regarding dividend distribution made by the state and SOEs will pose an impact on performance of the transaction cost and operation efficiency of the enterprise. Therefore, the enterprise dividend should be collected according to their categories reasonably, and the budget index should be refined to find a way to return the benefits to nationals.

License

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Article Type: Research Article

https://doi.org/10.12973/eurasia.2017.01029a

EURASIA J Math Sci Tech Ed, 2017 - Volume 13 Issue 8, pp. 5793-5803

Publication date: 22 Aug 2017

Article Views: 306

Article Downloads: 138

Open Access References How to cite this article